Voluntary versus compulsory unionism
The number one item on the associations' agenda is the clirnination of what they refer to as compulsory unionism (and which is referred to in the United States as union security). They claim they want to eliminate compul~ory unionism (NZEF, 1989b; NZEF, 1988a, p.3; NZBR, 1989, p.6; Hutton, 1987, p.6) , out of concern for the worker, 162 E.J. Da nnin out of concern for freedom, pure and si mple.l In a more candid explanation, Lindsay Fergusson of the Business Roundtable sees voluntary unionism as part of a programme "aimed at establishing a free and dccentraliscd system of contracting" that would facilitate " individualised form s of contracting which suit workers whose needs vary from the norm." In other words, he hopes that eliminating compu lsory unionism wou ld weaken unions. As is the case with m ost of the associations' proposals, he also contends that New Zealand and Australia are unique in maintaining compulsory unionism among all other OECD countries (Fergusson, 1989 , pp.6-7; NZBR, 1987, p.7; NZBR, 1986, p.47; Rowe, 1983, p.29) .
The Labour Relations Act, of course, docs not make unionism compulso ry in the sense that workers arc unable to escape union membership. Workers covered by an award must vote for compu l<;ory membership. In the case of an agreement the statute merel y makes It permiSSible for empl oyers and unions to agree to incorporate compulsory unionism c lauses. It docs not force emp loyer s to agree to them. The law also accommodates those workers who do not wish to belong by prov idin g a process for cxcmpllon from membership (s<;.82, and 83; sec generall y 19 77, p.201) . Workers thus arc gtvcn the legal abi lity to choose whether to belong to unions or not.
The moral n ghtncss or w rongness of forced union membership, the philosop hical questions of how best to anal og isc uni on membership, as akin to citizenship or club membership is a byway that we will forgo visiting in this article. T he question here is not concern for the nghts of workers or economic power, or even v.-hethcr peop le shou ld support or oppo<;c co mpulsory un1ontsm depending on how they feel about unions maintmning or increasing thctr power in relation to em ployers ( Hanson, et a!, 1982, p.9) . The qucslion here is w hether New Zealand stands virtually alone tn making union membership compuhory.
Anyone who has practiced m th e field of Industrial relations in the United States longer than a day w lll kn ow that it has the same feature, although it uses th e more benign term, union security. In a decade of prac tice in the field, I do not recall ever having seen a collecti ve bargaining agreemen t without a union secunty clause, and I am also aware that tht~ 1s an issue unions arc adaman t abou t 1n bargatntng. Not onl y do unions want them as a means of eltminating the problem of the free rider , the prC\Cnce of a bona fide union secunty cbuse is also necessary to in vok e the protec tions of the contract bar doctnne, prcventtng any other election being held in that unit for as much as 3 year<;.
~1orcovcr, a survey of other countr ies found that the} arc comm on to all developed countnes. In 1980 m Bntain, 40 percent of un10n members worked In closed shops, that is, est.abltshments that required union membership before empl oy men t (no fi gures were gi ven for other form~ of compu lsor y unionism there); in 1980 in th e United Sta tes, 97 percent of collec tive bargainmg agreemen t~ had some form o f union secu rity, with 74 percen t of construcuon union contracts prov Idtng for a de facto closed shop (a form of union secunty wh1ch IS outlawed elsewhere in the United States); in 1977 in Canada, 60 percent of manufacturing employees were covered by union shop provistons and another 8.7 percent by clo~ed ~hop provt~Jons. These arrangements arc common in Japan and even In many European countrtcs where th ey are outlawed. In Belgium, Denmark, Netherl ands, and France th e funcuonal equ ivalent o f co mpulsor y unio nt srn e\ISts (Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, pp.28-29) . Another stud y found that in the pcn od 75 shop or agency clauses and that in 1980, 85 percent had some sort of union security clause (Cullen, 1985, p.306) . Furthermore, compulsory payment of union dues even by non-members is accepted practice in countries, such as Canada, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.31).2 Perhaps the United States is often pointed to as an example in this area, (Fergusson, 1989, p.6 ) as a consequence of certain states' "right-to-work" laws, which proscribe many forms of compulsory unionism. They were enacted as a result of pressure from employer groups hoping to weaken unions in those states. Whether they have accomplished this goal is unclear.
Not a lot is clearly known about their effect, separated from pre-existing conditions, demographic , economic, or technical changes, and the like. It is known that wages arc lower in those states; however, they were lower prior to the enactment of right-to-work laws. Some studies find that the gap between union and non-union wages is higher in ri ght-to-work states. This is possibly the effect of unions not needing to trade off wages for union security clauses (Moore and Newman, 1985, pp. 579-80) . Furthermore, there is little evidence that righ t-to-work laws ha ve any effect on the level of unionisation or of lessening industrial strife. Indeed, in th e period 1964-78, there was a 45.6 percent increase in union mernbership in those states, as opposed to only a 4 percent increase in other states (Hanson et al., 1982, pp.l54-56; Delaney et al., 1985, p.62) . Part of this disparity can be explai ned by the effect of a lower base in right-to-work states. Finally , "strikes arc more likely to occur and arc more severe in states wllh ri ght-to-work statutes than elsewhere" (Gram m, 1986, p.373) .
Developing co untnes also support union security as a way to improve industrial relations by ensuring tndustrial stabihty and soctal development. Many believe that unions perform important functions in modem society and deserve special protec ti on (Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.24) , a phi losophy akin to that formerly held by New Zealand employers, that compulsory uniontsm was in their interests by leading to less workforce unrest and militancy (B rosnan, 1983, pp.2-3; Rudman, 1974, pp.61-63; Harbridge and Walsh. 1985, p.202; Hanson et al, 1982, p.l3) .
Before leaving this iss ue, it is Interesting that in a debate which claims to focus on worker rights, there has not been greater discussion of actual wot~cr behaviour. Objective data arc available. For instance, Howells has compiled staustics of ballots by union membership after 1977 on whether to rcLain an unquali tied preference clause. He found no grounds well of worker opposition to compulsory unionism (Howells, 1983 , pp.1 00-101, 1 06). The exercise was quite expensive. Balloting alone was estimated at $600,000, plus time los t to normal activities. The Department of Labour incurreJ ~500,000 travel expenses, plus employee salaries supervising the elections. Lost production time was estimated at 14,772 days, exceeding th e time los t in the second and third most strike prone industries in 2 of 4 years preceding 1976 (Howel ls, 1983, p.l07; Walsh, 1983, p.20) .
Harbridge and Walsh have dealt with the period after 1984, as a consequence of the Industrial Relations Amendment Act, whtch outlawed con1pulsory uniontsm. They found that most union s lost but between 1 and 5 percent of members during that period, wtth some of those losses actually attributable to redundancies as opposed to refusals to JOin (Harbridge and Walsh, 1985, pp.l99-200) Under the Labour Relations Act, workers vote on compulsory unionism if em ployers refuse to agree to a uni on membership provtsion. As at 18 October 1989, 44 ballots had been held, approximately 10 to 20 percen t of those whtch arc likely to be held . All supported including union membership provisions (Fuller, 1989, p.l4) . Accordtng L o the 164 E.J. Dannin
Office of the Registrar of Unions, that figure had risen to 70 ballots by February 13, 1990 , all supporting compulsory unionism.
Whatever interpretation can be made of worker behaviour, it can at least be said that workers arc not seizing opportunities to rid themselves of compulsory unionism. The interpretation of how the associations managed to miss the mark by so much is less clear.
Voluntary representation
The associations arc not only concerned about worker lack of freedom as represented by compulsory unionism. They arc also distressed that New Zealand workers are denied freedom of association by being represented by unions they personally may not have selected (NZBR, 1989, p.7; NZBR, 1986, p.48; Fergusson, 1989, p.9) . They want a procedure that docs away with this. The practical effect of abolishing the current system is unclear. Workers have many views and different desires. Full freedom to choose could lead to many unions representing an employers' workforce, with greater workplace strife and militancy. Competing unions increase demarcation disputes and the need for frequent negotiation (Brosnan, 1983, pp.2-3; Edwards, 1986, p.l45) This could also conflict with the associations' proposals that each worksite have one representative. It cannot be that workers both exercise full freedom of choice and yet arc represented only by one enterprise-wide agent.
Returning to the fundamental question addressed here, is New Zealand unique in not permitting workers unfettered freedom to choose? Again, the answer is that New Zealand's system has parallels abroad and not only in Australia. Many countries base their framework for industrial relations on exclusive bargaining rights for a union (Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.26) . In the United States, section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by Lhe majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of cmploymcnL A union is given this right if it is chosen by more than 50 percent of the unit. As institutions of a democratic country, i l is not surprising that New Zealand unions operate by the principle of majority rule. Indeed in the corporate context, shareholders or officers representing a minority view would not be permitted to divide the corporate structure. They arc expected to pull behind the majority view.
Award coverage
Next to compulsory unionism, employer organisations arc most opposed to award coverage as opposed to enterprise bargaining (NZEF, 1989a; NZEF, 1988a, p.3; NZBR, 1989, pp.7-9; NZBR, 1987a, pp.S-6) , also referred to as deccntraliscd labour relations (NZEF, 1988c; NZBR, 1987, p.5; NZB R, 1986, pp.5, 44 ) . The Business Roundtable claims: "Uniforn1 national agreements arc virtually unknown ouL")ide" Australia and Nc\\ Zealand (Trotter, 1986a, p.9) . Prior to the enactn1ent of the Labour Relat..ions Act, NC\\ Zealand provided for enterprise bargaining through secondary agreements (NZPC, 1986, pp.41-43; Harbridge and McCaw, 1989, pp.IS0-152; NZBR, 1987b, p.14) . Etnploycr organisations contend that the system docs not take into account employer ability to pa) and the possible existence of multiple agrccrncnts or awards applying in one workplace (Bradford, 1983; Rose, 1986, p. 73) .
Again, New Zealand is not unique in the existence of bargaining agreements which, like awards, extend beyond the single workplace. The level at which bargaining takes place in a counlry depends on factors such as national trarutions, the structure of employer and employee organisations, the level at which employee solidarity is felt, the size of the country, tactical considerations, and cconon1ic conditions (ILO, 1977, p.28) .
The Business Roundtable cites the United States as a successful model of a decentraliscd bargaining system (NZBR, 1987a, p.l 0) . In the United States, unions arc certified as representatives in units based on an en1ploycr's organisation in a craft, plant, employer-wide, or subdivision unit. Unions in the United States thus begin their representation at precisely the point desired by New Zealand employer organisations. This is not where the mallcr ends. Once a union has representation rights, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is indifferent to the unit in which negotiations t.herc.afler take place. Unions and employers can and do voluntarily alter representational units and, with them, agreement coverage (Weber, 1967, p.23) .
What do they choose? By 1961, of 150,000 co1lective bargaining agrcerncnts in the United States, multi-plant agreements dominated the manufacturing sec tor and multiemployer agreements the non-manufacturing sector (Weber, 1967, p.25) . More recently, 12 percent of contracts in production units were on a multi-ernployer basis and of 2034 single employer contracts, 29 were company-wide and based on indusLry-wide pattems,3 125 were company-wide, and 49 involved multiple unions and were company-wide (Hendricks and Kahn, 1982, p.198 ). In the non-manufacturing sector, the trend to multiemployer agreements is much sLronger, particularly in Lransportation and construction indusLries. In 1980, 33.6 percent of non-manufacturing conLracts were multi-employer and 13.9 percent were multi-plant. When manufacturing and non-Inanufacturing arc combined, 40.4 percent arc multi-employer (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.39; sec also Derber, 1984, pp.83-93) .
European counLries such as West Germany, Sweden, and Italy have also rnoved to multi-employer bargaining at the national level (Sisson, 1987, pp.13, 31, 90) . In Japan , multi-employer bargaining exists in industnes such as sh ipping, steel and metal, railways, printing and textiles (Sisson, 1987, pp.171-72; Levine, 1984, pp.347-53) . In Britain, where multi-employer bargaining has declined since the 1960s, the change has been accompanied by a large number of sLrikes (Sisson, 1987, pp.18-22) .
In addition, in many United States industries, particularly in those n1ost in1port.ant to the economy, pallem and coalition bargaining, national contracts, or r,1aster contracts arc the rule. Local supplements, simi lar in some respects to second tier bargaining arc also found (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.35; Sisson, 1987, pp.l71-72) . In British cornpanies in the private sector, nearly half bargain at a rnulti-crnploycr level (Boo th, 1989, pp.231-32) .
It is impossible to grasp the impact of union bargaining if one simply looks at the percentage of unorganised versus organised workers as the Business Roundtable docs (NZBR, 1987b, p.6 ). Many non-union American employers, including large ones such as IBM, model their wages and benefits on union contracts.
The reasons for choos ing the level of bargaining are complex. Employers with a verti cal structure comprising several plants may prefer a multi-plant agreement since a strike at one plant will mean a s toppage of all production (Weber, 1967, pp.21-22) . Small employers may prefer multi-employer bargaining to compensate for a power deficiency, to lower bargaining costs, or to ensure that competitors have made the same deal and will be hit with a strike at the same time, preventing them from increasing their market share (Weber, 1967, pp.1 5-17, 19; Booth, 1989, p.226; Sisson, 1987, pp.6-7; NZPC, 1986, p.47; Kahn-Freund , 1977, p.l32; Department of Labour, 1985, p.22) . In times of technol og ical or economic change, multi-employer bargaining can allow more successful resolutions of the ensuing problems (Willman, 1986, p.138) .
Not everyone opts for multi-employer bargaining. Unions may prefer to bargain at the lowest level to target one empl oyer, set a pattern agreement while that ctnployer's competitors are still in operation, and then whipsaw later employers (Booth, 1989, p.228; Weber, 1967, pp.20-21) . This occ urred with second tier bargaining in New Zealand (Pearson and Thoms, 1983, p.22) . Such an arrangement also has the advantage to the uni on that no t all members need be on strike at the same time. Unions may also prefer single employer bargaining as being more responsive to that workplace's needs and th us resulting in higher union affiliation among the membership (ILO, 1977, p.30) .
Employers who dominate a particular industry generally prefer sin gle empl oyer bargaining, feelin g they can negotiate th e agreement best for them, including one that in volves a higher settlement than their competitors can manage in the hope that they will be forced to follow the pattern and then be put out of busin ess (Booth, 1989, p.227 ; bu t cf. , NZ BR, 1989, pp .ll -12) . Some have suggested that enterpri se or decentralised barga ining results in a hi gher level of disarray in the workplace and in creased work stoppages (Barkin , 198 1, p.l 3; Hince, 1986, p.l 
7).
It is curious that employer organisations have taken such a strong stand on this issue, since thei r membership includes employers of all sizes, in all sorts of indus tries, with a multipl ic ity of needs. Th is was noted by the Department of Labour at the time submissions were made on the Labour Relations Ac t 1987 (Department of Labour, 1986, p.v) .
In any case, the Labo ur Relations Ac t allows an employer to nego ti ate at the enterprise level by inducing the union to do so, although the Ne w Zealand Business Roundtable doubts their abil ity to do this (NZBR , 1987 , p.l 5) . They can bargain less frequently by seeking agreements or awards for longer term s. These wo uld have the advantage of making condi ti ons more certa in for a longer period but the disadvan tage of prov idi ng less flex ibility to meet changing conditions. Nothing in the current legislati on prohibits empl oyers from offering combinati ons of inducements and persuasion to ac hieve the form of bargaining they desire. To the ex ten t they have not been successful , is not because of the Labour Relations Act but because others have not been persuaded.
Single union bargaining
Employe r associatio ns have advoca ted hav ing all e mployees of one en1ploycr represen ted by a single union (NZ BR, 1987a, p.5; NZ BR , 1986 , p .45~ NZEF, 1987 . Currently, a New Zealand empl oyer may have to deal with rnore than one union in the workplace. Ag3in, New Zealand is not alone in this. In the United States, for example, it is not unusua l for an e mpl oyer to bargain with more than one un 1on.
Hospitals present the most telling example. Congress mandated that there be no proliferation of bargaining units within health care institutions. After years of court battles and agency hearings, rules were promulgated finding 8 units to be presumed appropriate in the hospital context.4 No other indusLry has a requirement of nonproliferation.
Multiple bargaining units and agents do not favour one side or the other. It has been the experience of the NLRB that employees arc best represented within a unit of employees performing like work under similar conditions as opposed to being amalgamated in group with diverse interests, represented by a labour organisation not familiar with their terms and conditions of employment. Having more than one unit of representation may have an advantage to an employer of being able to continue operations in the event of a strike.
The infatuation of the associations with enterprise unions might best be explained by the following passage from one of their submissions:
Why do Japanese unions allow a degree of flexibility that would be an anathen1a to American unions? The reason: they arc organised company-wide rather than industry-wide. Because national unions in Japan rarely control locals' policies, a single industry contains several different 'enterprise unions' as lhey are called, and these unions compete with one another. Workers will moderate wage demands rather than jeopardise their firm's market share (NZBR, 1987b , pp.9-1 0).
Labour courts
Employer associations regularly argue for the abolition of the Labour Court's jurisdiction. They prefer that their jurisdiction be placed in the regular civil courts (NZBR, 1986, pp.iii, iv, 5-6, 11, 32, 40, 4 7) .
The Labour Court has virtually exclusive jurisdiction over industrial di~putes (Labour Relations Act, sections 278-308). While the Court normally consists of a judge alone, it has a tripartite structure of a legally trained judge assi~ted by two panel members nominated by organisations of employers and unions to deal with personal gnevances and demarcation disputes (Labour Relations Act s.286; sec also Department of Labour, 1986, pp.l8-19; Vranken and Hince, 1988) . Such a structure is con11non to E uropcan countries and the rest of the world (Aaron, 1985, pp.36-37; Vranken and Hince, 1988, pp.121-22) . The United States, differs in not having such a structure in its government labour courts but does retain it in certain arbitration situations.
The United States does maintain government agencies, including one of cabinet level, to investigate, prosecute, and decide violations of labour law: primarily the NLRB and the Department of Labor. The NLRB performs certain adjudicatory functions sin1ilar to the Labour Court but, in addition, prosecutes defined violations, such as illegally discriminatory acts and bargaining in bad faith. Furthermore, in its 50 years of existence it has developed a body of law specific to the regulatory needs of the workplace. These reflect an understanding that industrial law must develop without importing inappropriate common law concepts: Industrial law developed because the common law wa~ inadequate to deal satisfactorily with common events in the workplace, such as discharge or dissatisfaction with wages or other working conditions (Wilson, 1979, p.1; Atlcson, 1983, pp.l3-14, 94 ) . Dependence upon com mon law con tract concepts, for example, necessitates fitting the industrial reality to a Procru stean bed based on mutuality and freedom of contract, all the while requiring that one party to the relationship remain subservient to the daily and even changing demands of the other (S mith, 1975, pp.341-343, 365) .
To create law specifically applicable to the industrial context and then leave its interpretation and application in the hands of civil judges imbued with the common law will inevitably lead to an admixture of concepts which the law was enacted to be rid of (Wedderburn, 1987, pp.13-17; Kahn-Freund, 1977. pp.l2-14, 162) . The Labour Court judges have articulated the need to ensure that New Zealand's industrial law is applied in a manner consistent with reality and the purpose of the legislation. At his swearing in, Judge Goddard stated:
I am conscious of the task that confronts me. The Labour Court plays a unique role in promoting and advancing harmony in the workplace. Harmony leads to productivity and productivity leads to more jobs, but it docs more than that. It also conduces to that caring, tolerant and just society for which we all long .... This Coun uses special techniques of dispute resolution. Most of its cases arc decided not according to rigid or inflexible absolute rules of law but according to equity and good conscience . What this means is not generally understood. Equity is fair pl~y in action. Equity and good conscience involves an ethical approach to lhc Coun's work on a case by case basis. It involves the Coun in a persuasive as much as a coercive role and in a protective one in suggesting improved standards of conduct in the workplace. leading to that high level of mutual trust and confidence between employers and workers and between workers and their fellows necessary for the effective functioning of industry (Anon., 1989, p.JO).
The common law system has been largely irrelevant to New Zealand collective labour law since 1894, when New Zealand opted for a statutory system (Anderson, 1987, pp.91 -92) . The commo n law S) stem based itself on the primacy of private property and employer prerogative (\Vedderbum, 1987. pp.l3-14 ) . Atlcson observes that the common law courts have essentially implied into the fonnation of the employment contract a presumption that the employer has the right to seck to create the largest possible gap between the yield of its asscL<; (i.e. workers) and the cost of hire. (Atleson, 1983, p.l4.) . A return to the common law could be at the expense of developing a body of law relevant to tndustriallifc.
Continued representation
Employer associations also arc am hi tious to c urtai I the con tin ucd rcpn).SCnt~tional sta tu s of un1on s. One \\ay they propose to do this is by permitting employers to oflcr individual contract~ to workers, in essence, bidding against their union (NZEF, 1987, p.3; NZB R, 1986, pp.iv, 6-7, 4 7). The B usincss Roundtable claims that such "development of non-unioniscd arrangements" is permiLtcd elsewhere, but without specifying where (NZBR, 1986, p.49) .
Such a system could create chaos in the workplace, undercutting attempts to resolve workplace problems. At the time of expiration there could be weeks and months of uncertainty as an employer waged negotiations on several fronts. Bitterness and uncertainty, the seeds of indusLrial unrest, would find fertile ground.
Putting aside questions of the wisdom of fomenting chaos in the workplace, is such a practice permitted in the United States? The answer is that such an action in the United States would violate at least 3 sections of the NLRA. United States employers arc prohibited from dealing directly with employees or offering to those who cross the picket line higher wages than have been offered across the bargaining table.5 Such an offer is evidence per se of bargaining in bad faith, a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The failure to have such a requiren1ent may be the weakest link in th e New Zealand system of labour law at presenl. It permits and even encourages the employer to draw out negotiations hoping the union will be pressured to settle cheaply as its award nears its death, thereby essentially rewarding those who do not live up to their social obligation to engage in collective negotiations.Depending on the scale of the violation, section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA would also likely be violated, and either scheme would violate section 8(a)(l ).
The next time the associations venture into this sort of claim as to other countries' systems, it might want LO add Lhe congressional hearings for Lhe Wagner Act. The 2 large volumes arc replete with speeches Inveighing against precisely thi~ sort of behaviour.
The question of the commonality of employer and worker interests
The associations arc particularly up in anns over suggestions that the interests of employers and workers arc not one. With righteous indignation, they condemn those benighted souls who seck to put asunder those whom the individual employment contract has joined together. The associations blame adversarial relations on union officials who foster hostiJity for their own self interest:
The current system ... fosters conflict -the myth of an enduring struggle between capital and labour -where the reality is that employers and workers have a shared interest in serving consumers, an interest that can only b0 fostered by cooperation. It protects the narrow interest of the officials of established unions at the expense of workers ... (lv1yers, 1989, p. 3).
In the battle against advcrsarial relations, the associations' leitmotif is heard once more: countries such as the United States have abandoned such philosophies (NZBR, 1989, p.14; NZBR, 1987a, p.5; NZBR, undated, p.2; Hutton, 1987, p.4; Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.221-39; sec also NZBR, 1987b, pp.ii, 4, 6; NZBR, 1986, p.15) . The short answer is that there ha~ been no such legislative change in the United S rates. Some employers and unions have entered into cooperation agreements, just as those in New Zealand can and do under Lhe reviled Labour Relations Acl.
This raises an important issue which is implicit in the vision promulgated by the associations. The fundamental statements of the associations which propose a totalitarian view of labour relations, question the value of democratic institutions. It is quite clear that the associations think that it is the role of management to manage, and of labour, recognising the wisdom of management, to acquiesce supin~y. Early industrialists operated this way (D eck s, 1976, p.27; Atleson , 1983, pp.44-45) . Atlcson concludes that the fact so many Americans historically were either bound workers, apprentices, or slaves, not free to leave or change their circum sL.anccs, has continued to affect the view most Americans hold of the employment relationship and the roles of employer and employee (Atleson, 1983, p.88) . and a recent study suggests that these tendencies still exist among N ew Z ealand employers (M cAndrew, 1989, pp.142-43) . The associations' statem ents lend further support lO that conclusion .
D emocracy requires diversity and robust disc ussion. Blind obedience is not the lot of citizens. H ow the interests of democ racy and those of the corporation arc best served is a matter that is at least still open to di scussion . This warrants caution and the maintenance o f a responsive system, not the straitjacket that has been proposed. The Labour Relations A ct already permits settin g up the cooperati ve programmes the assoc iations espouse i f they can make a persuasi ve case to the unions. If unions arc not persuaded, the legi slative system has not failed. lL simply mean s that the case has not yet been made. Employers arc free to marshall their argum cnL~ and try again.
The assoc iations may be convtnccd that differences between employees and ~mploycrs no longer cx tst. However, there arc people who sincerely believe that important di visions rcma1n and that not until these differences have been composed can it be said there IS no need for a legislative system that recogni ses them.
T hose who believe that di f ferences still ex ist can point to a number of fac tors as ev idence. Employers, for example, want to keep wages low to increase shareholder profits and provide for tn vcstmcnt. W orkers want real wages set at a living rate or higher. W orkers owe respect and deference to their employers both in speech and non-verbal behav iour, but the reverse is not true. Employers want a qualified worker for each job. W orkers want to ensure there tS a JOb for each worker. Employers want flexibility to shed excess l abour w hen needed, and as ex peditiousl y as possible, thro ugh changes m hours worked, sovereign deciston-making as to deployment of workers and j ob conten t, and subcontracting. W orkers wan t j ob security. Employers are supposed to be sober and responsible in thei r cond uct, w hile employees arc assumed to need external control s placed on thetr behaviour. Employers have control o f the w orkplace and the sol e ri ght to regulate worker effort, w hile employees arc controlled and constrained not to regulate their level of effort. E mpl oyers sec work as outputs of production at a certain l evel of quality. W orkers define work as inpu ts of effort, time and thought. Finally, and most tellin g, the evidence is that the employer s like their j obs, w hereas mos t w orkers do not, nor do they f ind them chal l engmg or fu I fd ling ( Atktn so n, 1987, pp.89 -9 1; Atleson, 1983, pp. 7 -9; NZPC, 1986, pp.S, 2 1; K ahn-F reund, 1977, p.48 ; Macarov , 1982, pp.14, 95-96, 100-10 1) .
It is these di fferences w hich cause workers to feel a need for effec tive unions to present thetr dtstinct vtcws to management (M c Donald, 1974 , pp.22 1, 227) . While there need not be all-out war as a res ult of the dt ffcrcnt interes ts o f workers and employers, failure lO recognise thetr ex istence and importance is a failure to deal with reality.
Chi ef executi ves prefer to explain industrial conflict a<; poor communication (Ed wards, 1986, p.20) , conccntratmg on con ntct in terms of work stoppages alone (Brooks, 1974, p.205) . Employer associations have turned to employee in vol vement sc hem es to increase producl1v1ty and to decrease strike ac tivity. H owever , when these programmes ha ve been used as a technique to in crease production and not to incorporate true participation (S mi th, 1978, pp.7 1, 79) , they o ften dec line (Elligcr and N issen, 1987, pp.20 1-02) .
T he problem is tha t an employer can not ex press respect for his or her w orkers, yet c latm thc tr v iews, parllc ul ar l y m choosing unton representati on , arc not l eg itimate (S mith, 1978, p.74; M cDonald , 1974 , p.227) . StiO~n g union input as a co nduit for worker views may have disastrous effects. T hese include absenteeism, labour turnover, tardin ess, acc id cnt'i, poor pe rformance, h1 gh wastage, lack o f care o f equipm ent, demorall c;au on, wo rkmg to rule, and even sabotage. Tht s lo t productivity can be m ore costl y th an strikes, altho ugh more diffic ult to measure (Broo ks, 1974 , p .205~ Brown, 1977, pp.380-81; Edwards, 1986, pp.lO, 37, 50, 73, 249, 256; Willman, 1986, p.202; Decks, 1976, p.31; Howells, 1974, p.175; Schmidt, 1972, pp.26-28; Atlcson, 1983, pp.36-39; Wilson, 1979, pp.3-4 ) . 6 Grievance systems set up without union involvement have been found insufficient to replace those provided by unions, because employees fear rep risals or feel they are ineffective since a high percentage of decisions uphold management's original decision (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.1 08-09) .
The most strongly expressed complaint by the associations is that unions block change. It has been found that unions do not block legitimate change when they arc provided information , equity and access to decision-making but do when the employment relationship is characterised by suspicion (Willman, 1986, pp.106-07 ; sec also Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.174-75) . It is easy to be frustrated if a union docs not feel the same en thusiasm for a change management might like to make (Department of Labour, 1986, pp.1-2) or to be frustrated at not being able to take unilateral action (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.73) . However, studies have concluded that management is more often responsible for inefficient labour utilisati on. A 1976 British survey of the causes of inefficient labour use found that of the 26 studies surveyed, 2 1 identified manage ment failures as a cause, and 10 identified them as the key cause. 9 iden tified unsatisfactory employer-union negotiating procedures as a cause. In contrast, 14 identified union restrictive practices and none found it to be a key cause. Willman also concluded that Brit.ish managers created unnecessary anxiety among workers facing technological change and displacement, wh ich in tum led to less efficient and satisfactory resolutions (Willman, 1986, p.SS-59) . In addillon unilateral action is unwise since it increases resistance by leaving unions unable to respond on any other level than protecting job security and worker earnings (Willman, 1986, p.166) .
Some countries have found that unions contribute to business success. In the Uni ted States, the effectiveness of employee involvement programmes tn improving quality and productivity, as judged by management, is increased by the percentage of the workforce which is unioniscd (Cooke, 1989, p.313) Recent studies in the Un1tcd States have found that a unioniscd workforce increases productivity by 1 to 2 percenL This is attribu ted to a lower quit rate caused by the grievance system and features such as scnioray which increase employees' security and feeling of having a voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.95-1 09; Freeman, 1980, pp.30, 31 ) , and also to a change in management atlltudcs resulting in greater cooperat.ion in matters such as introducing r.ew technology (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.174-75) . Such an effect was anucipated by the 1894 Industrial Conciliation &Arbitration Act (Pearson and Thorns, 1983, pp.138-39) . This level of improved productivity is, however highly scnsJtlve to the state of labour-management relat.ions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.176) .
In addition to improving worker attitudes, collective bargaining causes management to think through contemplated changes, and to explore alternatives 1n order to present a clear case for the union. In some cases, management may not know the best way to achieve efficiency and, even if it did could not always achieve its goals (Edwards, 1986, pp.220-21; Willman, 1986, p.45) 7. Added deliberation may save management from dashing to 6 One worker, reflecting on his frustration in working a low paid, wet, difficult job without readily available protective equipment stated: "In fact, most people here llke 1t best when things don't work right and production goes to hell, and I'm right along with them. And that's a crummy way to waste your working time" (fumer, 1987, pp.7 -8) .
7
In one case studied a chief executive officer sabotaged hi~ employee involvement programme by his unwillingness to change the corporat'C culture of a unilateral management (Chelte et al., 1989, p.l53) . The nature of the opposition to unions in New Zealand takes on a different character and is acted upon in different ways than is the case m the United States. In the United States, the battle lines arc drawn outside the legislative implement every newly attractive trend. They may gain a more sophisticated understanding of the ramifications of the contemplated change. A study of negotiators' attitudes found that after negotiating, the bargainers' appreciation for the validity of the goals of the other side increased (Smith and Turkington, 1981, p.11) .
Conclusions
This analysis is a curious exercise. Anyone who has reached this point should be well aware that basic arguments of the New Zealand Business Roundtable and Employers Federation arc objec tively untrue. By this I mean that the incorrect assertions made by them cannot be explained by dtfferences in ideology or viewpoint. They ignore well known laws which they could read by opening the appropriate statute book. They ignore
• c lauses found nearly universally in collective bargaining agreements. They ignore phenomena of industrial relation~ syste ms commonly discussed and found in books and journal~ in New Zealand. Finally, they ignore the impact of worldwide economic problems, New Zealand\ specta l problems of s11.e and location , and New Zealand's relatively good performance compared with other co untries of its Size (Rose, 1986, p.67) and prefer arguments which, even 1f true, arc at best a poor means of explaining New Zealand's economic problems. Thctr underlying argument is that unions arc Illegitimate. They claim thi s in part because they owe thctr existence tn New Zealand to statute (NZBR, 1986, p.7 ; sec also Wedderburn, 1984, pp. 78-79) . If owing ones' existence to statute made one illegitimate, then what would be the fate of many members of employer organisations? After all, corporauons arc not found in nature. They were created by legislative action and would otherwt~c not be legal. A corporation is noth mg but an aggregation of capital given the legal sta tus of a person and perm ittcd to do busmcss while not making those who benefit responsible for its acuons (Anderson, 1987, p.94-95; Wedderburn , 1987, p.21; Ireland , et al., 1987, p.149-50, 153 ).
Indeed, but for the protections in law provided to corporations, union s might be unn cccs~ry (Vrank en, 1986, p.7) . Unions carne inlo existence to perrnit workers to deal effectively with the aggregations of capital penniued by the corporate fonn (Bark1n, 1981 , pp.2-3). Were corporc..Lions to be weighed in the same sca le advocated for unions, the current news of emp lo;er fraud and mismanagement wh1ch has wrought economic havoc and Lami~hed New Zealand\ repuu.lljon, mtght well support a call for an end to the special privileges the corporate form provides. The point, however, ts not to ftx blame but to gai n the sophisticated perspective necessary to make wise decisions.
Perhaps what the employer a~~octauons arc trying to say Is that the balance of power has tilted too strongly towards labour. That Is a fair matter for debate and discussion. So far, available objective dat.a do not )upport that conclusion. For example, a study of the 1987/1988 wage round led to the concl usion that en1p loyers had experienced greater power 1n it and were able to achieve outcomes favourab le to them in term~ of work rules and arena. Freeman and Medoff 'Hale t.hat dcsptte pub!tc awareness of criminality within union ranks, the rate of corporule criminal V10lat10n.s far exceeds that of unions. They speculate that tht.s 1s caused by the access to large amounts of money by companies and their greater potential t.o engage in criminal act.s (Freeman and Medoff. 1984. pp.214-15) . The qualification is necessary since in instances in which labour-management relations deteriorate, producltVtty suffers They concluded that in the United States unions have no effect on the proft ts of competttt ve firms. They do lower the profit margins of scmimonopoll.sttc firms to normal competitive levels (Freeman and Medoff. 1984, pp.l82-82) In lhis way, unions serve as a substitulc for anti-trust measures, pcrmiuing the public to share in those profits (Ulman, 1967, p.l).
other aspects of awards without having to concede any extra wages (Harbridge and McCaw, 1989, p.161~ Harbridge and Drcaver, 1989, p.253-55) .
Caution must be exercised in pcrmiuing further aggrandisement of power. It goes without saying that if every employer is able to pay its employees as little as possible, soon there will be no workers able to purchase what is produced. (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989, p.52; Abbott, 1989, p.284) . Of greater long term danger is economic research that indicates companies paying lower wages have less incentive to become more productive (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989, p.l6; Willman, 1986, p.45) . In the United States, those companies that arc unionised and with higher wages can also be the most productive (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.167-70) . It may also be that increased worker productivity is most effectively achieved through higher pay rather than tinkering with legislative systems (Macarov, 1982, pp.l67-68) .
Before considering further changes we must ask, first, whether the fundamental changes advocated may be inimical to a society which has evolved in response to a certain legislative scheme and, second, whether it is wise to tilt the balance of industrial relations even further towards employers. In short, New Zealand will be best served by a labour relations policy that embodies democratic values of justice and tolerance and that is ca~t in the mould of its unique qualities and national vision.
What is unacceptable, however, is that a po-werful segment of a soctety abdicate its responsibility to the public by pursuing a course to achieve its own ends. Perhaps in the age in which we live, a call for responsibility IS so idealistic that the reader will be forced to blush that anyone could be so ingenuous. Risking that, I think it is patently obvious that we need a functioning democracy in order to retain a vibrant, diverse community. Those unwilling to join honestly and serious!) In discourse on those terms ultimately do a grave disservice to the sptrit of democracy and candid purposeful debate. Without a doubt, the people of New Zealand expect and ceruunly deserve better.
